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INTRODUCTION
Wall established in his opening brief that a “‘heavy burden of persuading the
court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up
again,’” is placed on a defendant asserting that a claim is moot due to the voluntary
cessation of that defendant’s actions. AOB 11, citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000). Red Onion does not dispute
that. It only asserts that there is “no reason to believe that prison officials will
revive the 2010 Ramadan Policy,” AB 13, without pointing to a single piece of
evidence in the record to support this contention. Red Onion’s conjecture is
insufficient. It did not even attempt to meet its heavy burden of production below,
and thus, Wall’s request for equitable relief under the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (the “Act” or “RLUIPA”) is not moot.
Additionally, despite Red Onion’s acknowledgement in a policy
memorandum that it was “not appropriate to require inmates to buy something
which is related to exercising First Amendment rights,” Red Onion still contends
that conditioning Wall’s Ramadan participation on producing religious materials to
prove his sincerity did not violate Wall’s Free Exercise Rights. AB 21. Red Onion
attempts to justify its policy in light of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court
in Turner v. Safley, arguing that other alternatives to the 2010 policy are not a good
fit in the prison context, AB 28. However, Red Onion repeatedly references the
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fact that Wall has been able to participate in Ramadan since their policy changed to
take a more reasonable approach to the assessment of sincerity, thus undercutting
their argument that the 2010 policy was a legitimate method of testing sincerity.
See e.g. AB 5, 7, 9, 12.
The 2010 Ramadan policy’s requirement that “inmates buy something” or
possess some specific object to prove their faith was clearly “not appropriate.” AB
13-14. A reasonable official should have understood that a rule requiring only
physical tokens of an inmate’s faith was not sufficient justification to deny Wall
his right to participate in Ramadan. Therefore, this Court should reverse the
district court’s ruling and remand the case for further proceedings.
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Appeal: 13-6355

Doc: 36

Filed: 06/27/2013

Pg: 7 of 26

ARGUMENT
I.

RED ONION FAILS TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT
THE VOLUNTARY CESSATION OF THE RAMADAN POLICY
MOOTS WALL’S CLAIMS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER
THE ACT.
A.

Wall Sufficiently Asserted A Claim For Injunctive Relief And
Both Red Onion And The District Court Address This Claim As
If Properly Asserted.

Despite Red Onion’s assertion to the contrary, Wall’s request for equitable
relief is available under the Act. Under the Act, a person “residing in or confined
to an institution,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a), may assert a claim in a judicial
proceeding and subsequently “obtain appropriate relief against a government.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). Appropriate relief “ordinarily includes injunctive and
declaratory relief.” Madison v. Virginia, 474 F.3d 118, 130-31 (4th Cir. 2006).
Thus, where Wall asserts a claim under RLUIPA, equitable relief in the form of
injunctive and declaratory relief is available.
Red Onion acknowledges Wall’s claim for declaratory relief, but asserts that
Wall waived any claim for injunctive relief in the Amended Complaint. AB 10.
As the Act allows for both declaratory and injunctive relief, it is irrelevant to
mootness whether injunctive relief was properly pled. The parties agree that Wall
has a properly pled claim for declaratory relief under the Act. In any event, Wall
properly pled injunctive relief. Although the Amended Complaint does not use the
specific term injunctive relief, the complaint clearly incorporates requests for
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injunctive remedies. As a pro se plaintiff, Wall is entitled to a liberal construction
of his pleadings. AB 10; see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). No
matter how “inartfully pleaded,” a pro se complaint must be held to a “less
stringent standard” than the standard applied to complaints drafted by lawyers.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Red
Onion recognized the required leniency and goes on to say that, while the court
needs not search for some unexpressed intent, the court is to rely on the meaning of
the words used in the complaint. AB 10.
The purpose of injunctive relief is to “prevent future violations.” Edwards
v. Flowers, 460 F.2d 1191, 1192 (4th Cir. 1972). In his complaint, Wall seeks
relief from Red Onion’s denial of his “right to exercise [his] chosen religion by
participating in a[n] obligatory religious service (Ramadan).” JA32. Wall’s claims
center on his unlawful removal from participation in the Ramadan month of fasting
and he specifically asks the court to find that removal unconstitutional. JA33. A
fair reading of Wall’s Amended Complaint makes clear that the relief he seeks is
injunctive in nature. Moreover, both Red Onion and the district court interpreted
Wall’s Amended Complaint as seeking injunctive relief. Red Onion argued before
the district court that Wall’s claim for injunctive relief was moot due to his
participation in subsequent Ramadan observations. JA80-81. Likewise the
District Court ruled that Wall’s claim for injunctive relief was moot and his
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subsequent return to Red Onion too speculative to support injunctive relief.
JA142-143. Importantly, neither Red Onion nor the district court made any
statement or argument to suggest that Wall failed to seek injunctive relief. Thus,
based on the Amended Complaint, the nature of Wall’s claims and the record
showing that both Red Onion and the district court treated Wall as having sought
injunctive relief, Wall’s claims for both declaratory and injunctive relief can and
should properly be considered on remand.
B.

Wall’s Claim For Equitable Relief Is Not Moot Because Red
Onion Has Failed To Meet Its Heavy Burden Under The
Voluntary Cessation Doctrine.

Wall’s move back to Red Onion makes his claim for equitable relief
justiciable, regardless of the fact that in the interim time Red Onion may have
changed its Ramadan policy. Red Onion asserts that because it voluntarily ceased
its policy Wall’s claim is moot. In order to succeed on such an argument Red
Onion must show “that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be
repeated.” United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953). Red
Onion—the party asserting mootness—must meet “[t]he heavy burden of
persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to
start up again.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189 (2000) (quotations omitted); see also Lyons P’ship v. Morris Costumes,
Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 800-801 (4th Cir. 2001). Red Onion’s voluntary cessation of
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their inappropriate conduct “does not deprive a federal court of its power to
determine the legality of the practice unless it is absolutely clear that the allegedly
wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Doe v. Kidd, 501
F.3d 348, 354 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Friends of the Earth Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)). This rule prevents the government from
changing its policy in order to moot litigation while leaving open the opportunity
to change the policy back after proceedings conclude.
Although Red Onion asserts, without any factual support in the record, that
the latest iteration of its Ramadan policy will not be rescinded, AB 13, it fails to
embrace or meet its burden of affirmatively supporting this assertion. Red Onion
bears the “heavy burden” of affirmatively showing that (1) there is no reasonable
expectation the alleged policy or practice will recur, and (2) interim relief or events
have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged violation.
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979); Friends of the Earth,
Inc., 528 U.S. at 189. The voluntary cessation standard helps to ensure that
defendants will not reinstate improper policies post-litigation. Thus, even if Red
Onion changed its 2010 policy and subsequently provided Wall the opportunity to
participate in Ramadan, Wall’s claims are not moot until Red Onion has satisfied
its burden.
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Red Onion presents no evidence to show that the 2010 Ramadan policy
would not be reinstated. In fact, Red Onion hardly provides any evidence that the
2010 Ramadan policy is no longer in effect. Instead of presenting any evidence,
Red Onion merely refers to another case for the proposition that the 2010 Ramadan
policy was changed. See DePaola v. Wade, No. 7:11-cv-00198-SGW-RSB (W.D.
Va. Jan. 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-6803 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 2012). The district court
took notice of the information presented in DePaola and concluded, based on the
record of that case, that the 2010 Ramadan policy was rescinded in 2011.
Regardless, Red Onion has provided absolutely no evidence to show that the
2010 Ramadan policy will not be changed again and reenacted at some point after
litigation. Although Red Onion states in its brief here that there is little reason to
believe the 2010 Ramadan policy will return, AB 13, there is no factual support for
that assertion. Instead, Red Onion admits to a demonstrated pattern of changing its
policies concerning Ramadan frequently, as different policies were utilized in
2009, 2010 and again in 2011. AB 1-2. To meet its burden Red Onion must
provide some admissible evidence that the policy will not be reenacted. In other
cases, such evidence might come in the form of an affidavit stating that the
unconstitutional conduct will not happen again, Sossamon v. Lone Star State of
Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2009) (Prison director affidavit stating the
policy of denying prisoners access to religious services had ended “was sufficient”
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to meet the heavy burden), or a showing that the unconstitutional policy had not
been reinstated for many years, County of Los Angeles, 440 U.S. at 632
(discriminatory civil service exam had not been used in over ten years). On the
contrary, when a party continues to assert the acceptability of its position,
mootness is not found and the claim must be assessed on its merit. Com. of Va. ex
rel. Coleman v. Califano, 631 F.2d 324, 326-27 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia’s claims
against the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare were not moot where
the Department “continued to assert the correctness of its position.”). In light of
the constantly-changing policy, the lack of oversight over the policy and Red
Onion’s assertion that the “policy as a whole was reasonable,” (AB 22), more than
a simple affidavit likely would be required to meet Red Onion’s burden here, but
the Court need not address what amount of evidence is required to meet the
burden: Red Onion presented none at all.
Red Onion’s failure to satisfy its burden under the voluntary cessation
doctrine is not excused because Red Onion is a government defendant. Even if a
government defendant has a “lighter burden,” the government still has a burden to
make “absolutely clear” that an alleged violation cannot “reasonably be expected
to recur.” Sossamon, 560 F.3d at 325; see also Americans United for Separation of
Church & State v. Prison Fellowship Ministries, Inc., 509 F.3d 406, 421 (8th Cir.
2007)(claim was not moot where Department of Corrections, et al., failed to
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provide “any assurance that they will not resume the prohibited conduct”). Red
Onion argues that a prison, like a state legislature, should only be liable under the
voluntary cessation doctrine if it “openly announc[es] its intention to reenact” a
formerly improper policy. Valero Terrestrial Corp. v. Paige, 211 F.3d 112, 116
(4th Cir. 2000). However, a change in Red Onion’s prison policies cannot
properly be analogized to legislative action. Unlike a legislature, Red Onion
officials have the ability to unilaterally change policies without significant
procedural hurdles. Red Onion officials are also not in the public eye or
accountable to the public in the same fashion as legislatures. Thus additional
assurances beyond legislative inertia are required to ensure that a prison policy will
not recur.
Even if Red Onion could shift the burden to Wall, Wall has met any burden
just on the facts provided by Red Onion. Red Onion, attempting to shift its burden
to Wall, states that he does not allege that the policy change was merely in
response to litigation. AB 13. However it is Red Onion’s burden, not Wall’s, to
show that the policy change was not a result of litigation. Yet again Red Onion
fails to present any evidence to support its assertion that the policy change was not
related to litigation. In any event, the circumstances surrounding the policy’s
cessation establish that Red Onion’s actions were connected to or motivated by
litigation. On September 19, 2011, Red Onion filed a Motion for Protective Order
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and Memorandum in Support of that Motion in the DePaola matter. See DePaola,
No. 7:11-cv-00198 (W.D. Va., Sept. 19, 2011), ECF No. 25. That protective order
sought, in part, to curtail DePaola’s discovery requests concerning his claim for
injunctive relief. Id. at p. 2-3. In support of their argument that DePaola’s request
for injunctive relief was moot, Red Onion relied on its policy change to no longer
require possession of religious items. Id. at 3. As Red Onion failed to present any
evidence of this change in its motion, the Court later requested some proof that
Red Onion’s policy had changed. Red Onion produced an affidavit and
memorandum showing that its policy changed on September 13, 2011, a mere 6
days before it filed the motion seeking a protective order relying on the elimination
of the 2010 Ramadan policy. See DePaola, No. 7:11-cv-00198 (W.D. Va., Jan 20,
2012) ECF No. 35-1. Additionally, the Department of Corrections’ memorandum
itself states that the policy was changed in response to an investigation “concerning
the management of Muslim inmates in segregation at one of our facilities, and their
eligibility for Ramadan.” Id. at 2. It notably omits, however, any explanation for
why this investigation was initiated.
The extremely close temporal connection to litigation and the use of that
policy change as the justification to avoid discovery in litigation meet any burden
of establishing that Red Onion changed its policy directly in response to litigation.
Red Onion’s failure to produce any evidence concerning the reasons for the policy
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change or any evidence to suggest that it was motivated by something other than
litigation certainly fails to rise to an adequate level for Red Onion to meet its
burden under the voluntarily cessation doctrine or to respond to evidence that Red
Onion was motivated by litigation. In light of the frequency of Red Onion’s policy
changes concerning Ramadan participation, the close connection to the policy
change and ongoing litigation challenging the policy and Red Onion’s lack of any
evidence that that policy will not be revived, Red Onion has failed to discharge its
heavy burden under the voluntary cessation doctrine. Therefore, the district court’s
finding of mootness should be reversed and Wall’s claim under the Act for
injunctive and declaratory relief be allowed to proceed.
II.

RED ONION OFFICIALS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FROM WALL’S SECTION 1983 CLAIMS.
A.

Red Onion’s Policy Undisputedly Burdened Wall’s Sincerely Held
Religious Beliefs.

Red Onion does not attempt to dispute the sincerity of Wall’s Nation of
Islam faith or challenge that the prevention or prohibition of Wall’s observance of
Ramadan would clearly infringe upon his sincere religious beliefs. Instead Red
Onion argues that because this Court and the Supreme Court have not set forth
specific limitation as to how the Red Onion officials can inquire into Wall’s
sincerity, there are therefore no clearly established “constitutional limits on a
prison official’s inquiring into religious sincerity.” AB 18. Red Onion then argues
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that the “lack of any governing authority” giving precise guidance on what means
prison officials might use to screen for religious sincerity, even if there is
persuasive authority from other Circuits demonstrating “the unreasonableness of
defendant’s actions,” entitled the Red Onion officials to immunity. AB 20-21.
Thus, Red Onion essentially argues that until this Court or the Supreme Court
prohibit a particular type of examination into a prisoner’s sincerity of belief, prison
officials can inquire into that sincerity in any manner they elect with impunity.
However, an official action does not lose the protection of qualified
immunity only when the very act in question has previously been held to be
unlawful, but also when the impropriety is reasonably apparent from the then
existing laws. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). “The fact that an
exact right allegedly violated has not earlier been specifically recognized by any
court does not prevent a determination that it was nevertheless “clearly
established” for qualified immunity purposes.” Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,
314 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th
Cir. 1999) (“[T]he nonexistence of a case holding the defendant's identical conduct
to be unlawful does not prevent the denial of qualified immunity.”). Thus, the
Court considers “whether a reasonable person in the official's position would have
known that his conduct would violate that right.” Id. (citing Anderson, 483 U.S. at
639). A clearly established right is one that is “manifestly included within more
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general applications of the core constitutional principle invoked.” Pritchett, 973
F.2d at 314.
Contrary to Red Onion’s assertion, while Red Onion may inquire into the
sincerity of a prisoners beliefs, that inquiry is not without guidance as to what
could constitute a permissible test of those beliefs. First, it is clearly established
that “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.” Thomas
v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
Further, this Court has clearly indicated that an individual does not need to
participate in all aspects of a religion in order for their belief to be sincere.
Dettmer v. Landon, 799 F.2d 929, 932 (4th Cir. 1986) (“Religious observances
need not be uniform to merit the protection of the first amendment.”).
Additionally, the question of one’s sincerity of belief is a factual inquiry, not a
bright line legal rule. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). Red
Onion officials may not substantially burden Wall’s sincerely held religious belief
by any action that “put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir.
2006) (citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718). It is not permissible to assume “that lack
of sincerity (or religiosity) with respect to one practice of a given religion means
lack of sincerity with respect to others.” Id. at 188.
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Red Onion cannot reasonably dispute that Wall’s faith was and is sincerely
held as demonstrated by his past successful participation in Ramadan, his inclusion
in the Common Fare program, and his repeated requests to participate in Ramadan
during the time at issue. See JA138-39. Further, Wall provided clear evidence to
the Red Onion officials that the physical objects they deemed so necessary to
demonstrate faith were lost by the Department of Corrections during his transfer to
Red Onion. JA138-39. Despite these clear indications of sincerity and with the
legal backdrop that sincerity is a fact-specific inquiry where one is not required to
participate in every aspects of a religion (Dettmer, 799 F.2d at 932), Red Onion
nevertheless determined that Wall’s beliefs were not sincere. These actions clearly
placed additional burdens on Wall to obtain specific physical objects to prove his
faith and unreasonably ignored this Court’s precedent on what can constitute
sincerity. Given all the information establishing the sincerity of his belief, even if
Wall affirmatively elected not to have any physical relics specifically related to his
faith, the Red Onion officials were not reasonable in concluding that he was
insincere in his faith and preventing his observation of Ramadan.
Wall was ultimately forced to choose between observance of faith and his
survival. The District Court clearly recognized the burden placed on Wall’s faith
by Red Onion as Wall, “[f]aced with starvation and repeated sanctions for trying to
eat during the night,” elected to eat during the day, violating his religious beliefs.
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JA139. Red Onion officials themselves conceded that the policy imposed a
substantial burden on Wall’s faith. JA78. Therefore, Red Onion’s policy, which
clearly imposed a substantial burden on Wall’s observation of his faith, must meet
the four factors first articulated in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
B.

The Turner Factors Show Red Onion’s Policy To Be Clearly
Unreasonable.

Given the fact that the Turner factors are clearly established law, no
reasonable officials should or would act in such a fashion as to obviously violate
them. If the Red Onion officials violated Wall’s clearly established rights as
understood when analyzed under the Turner factors, they lose the protections of
qualified immunity and are liable for their failure to adhere to the constitutional
requirements laid out by the Supreme Court. Under Turner, there first must be “a
‘valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the legitimate
governmental interest put forward to justify it.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (quoting
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)). Second a court looks to “whether
there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison
inmates.” Id. at 90. The analysis then turns to the impact the accommodation of
the constitutional right will have on prison resources and finally, whether there are
“ready alternatives” to the prison’s regulation or policy. Id. at 90-91.
While a connection might exist between requiring the production of some
physical token of faith and the reduction of the costs of allowing inmates to
- 15 -
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observe Ramadan, such a requirement is not a “logical [or] reasonable means of
distinguishing Ramadan observers” (AB 23) who were sincere in their faith. Such
a policy will clearly eliminate the cost of accommodating those inmates who have
sincere religious beliefs but are unable, for whatever reason, to produce acceptable
physical items displaying their faith. However, it is unreasonable to presume that
because an inmate does not possess some acceptable religious relic they lack a
sincere faith. Wall provides a clear example of just how unreasonable this policy
is in practice. Despite the other outward manifestations of his faith, including his
past participation in Ramadan and common fare diet, and despite the explanation
and evidence as to why he was unable to produce any religious relics when
demanded to do so, the Red Onion official decided “[t]hat don’t mean anything”
and removed Wall from the Ramadan list. JA139.
Despite Red Onion’s assertion, Wall did not have and was refused
“alternative means of exercising” the faithful the observation of Ramadan. AB 25.
As stated above, Wall attempted to demonstrate his sincerity through alternative
means but Red Onion decided that did not mean anything unless he could produce
some physical object to prove his sincere belief. When Red Onion still refused to
permit his participation in Ramadan, Wall attempted to exercise the faithful
observance of Ramadan by saving his meals in his cell to eat it after sundown as
the tenants of his faith required. JA139. Wall, however, was not only prohibited
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from saving the food but also threatened with punishment for his attempt to
exercise his faith through alternative means. JA139. Furthermore, the inmates at
Red Onion are severely limited in the alternative means available to them to more
broadly participate in the observations of their religious practice, including a
prohibition on participation in group religious services. JA138 n. 3; JA74. Thus,
Wall did not have and was prohibited from adequate alternative means to exercise
his faith.
The analysis of the third and fourth Turner factors similarly cut strongly in
Wall’s favor. Red Onion appears to argue that no viable alternatives to the 2010
Ramadan policy existed and that the impact of any accommodation or change
would be substantial. At the same time Red Onion acknowledges that it not only
employed a different policy with a different standard through 2009 but also
implemented a new policy in 2011 which again applied a different standard and
allowed a for a variety of methods to demonstrate sincerity of belief. AB 12, 2830. The argument that any alternatives or accommodations would unreasonably
tax prison resources is simply not compelling when, as here, Red Onion has
utilized much less restrictive alternatives and has affirmatively argued that the
implementation of its new policy moots Walls claims. AB 12, 28. Moreover, as
explained in Wall’s opening brief, Red Onion’s own guidance documents provide
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several alternatives to Red Onion’s Ramadan policy. AOB 20; JA88. Red Onion
does not respond to that point.
It is disingenuous for Red Onion to argue that a different, more inclusive
policy, would unreasonably burden prison resources when, at the same time, it
argues that Wall’s argument under the Act is moot due to Red Onion’s new, less
restrictive policy. AB 12. Simply accepting any or all of Wall’s ample proof of
the sincerity of his belief, would result in no additional burdens on staff, inmates,
or prison resources beyond the burdens Red Onion has to implement and enforce
the new policy which allows such things to be used to demonstrate sincerity of
belief. Thus, it is clear that Red Onion’s policy and the implementation against
Wall were not reasonable under Turner.
As discussed above, Wall pled facts establishing a constitutional violation
under the Free Exercise Clause. Wall also pled sufficient facts to allow a
reasonable fact-finder to decide that the Red Onion Officials acted intentionally in
depriving Wall of his right to participate in Ramadan and thus supports an as
applied challenge. A reasonable prison official would have known that requiring
physical items and only physical items as proof of an inmate’s faith was an
unacceptable justification for denying Wall’s right to participate in Ramadan.
Red Onion’s policy as applied to Wall set an unreasonably high threshold
for proving sincerity, as it excluded even a devout inmate with (1) a recorded
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history of observing Ramadan, (2) prior approval for a special diet to accommodate
his faith, and (3) evidence that his belongings, including his religious belongings,
were lost by the prison system itself. The Red Onion officials applied their policy
in such a way that failure to follow one practice (possessing a Quran or prayer rug)
is used to preclude the inmate from engaging in another practice (fasting during
Ramadan). Then, Red Onion Officials mischaracterized Wall’s statement to make
it appear as if he, himself elected not to participate. Any reasonable officer would
have known such actions were impermissible. See Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 188
(“Such an inmate's right to religious exercise is substantially burdened by a policy,
like the one here, that automatically assumes that lack of sincerity (or religiosity)
with respect to one practice means lack of sincerity with respect to others.”).
Therefore, defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on either the
question of mootness or their qualified immunity and the trial court ruling should
be reversed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
in defendants’ favor should be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
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